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                          Abstract 
The Affordable Care Act was passed in 2010, and immediately enacted a 
provision that allowed young adults to remain on their parents’ insurance until age 26.  
In my thesis, I estimate the impact of this provision on access to insurance, and health 
behaviors of the young. Health behaviors include primary care visits, vaccinations, and 
emergency room visits. I use a difference-in-differences approach using young adults 
aged 23-25 as a treatment group and adults aged 27-29 as a comparison group. The 
expansion provision of the bill led to higher rates of insurance coverage for young adults. 
There were no statistically significant effects on preventative or primary health care 
measures in the full sample. Minorities and those without college degrees experienced the 
highest increases in insurance coverage.     
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  Introduction 
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act was passed in Congress, revamping the 
healthcare system in the U.S. Most of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act were set 
to begin in 2014, 4 years after its enactment1. One of the provisions enacted in 2011 
allowed young adults to remain on their parent’s insurance plans until age 262.  
The provision was enacted to boost insurance rates among young adults in their twenties, 
a group with historically low insurance rates. This paper seeks to answer the question: 
What are the changes in health behaviors of the young as a result of the ACA? First, how 
has the ACA affected insurance rates3 for young adults; and second how has the ACA 
affected the use of primary and preventative health services such as doctor’s visits, 
vaccinations, and emergency room visits for this group.  
The ACA has been a highly debated and legally contested piece of legislation 
since it’s passing4. The costs of the legislation are projected at around $1.2 trillion5. With 
such high costs many argued that it was unlikely for the benefits of the bill to outweigh 
the costs. Advocates for the legislation argued that it would be effective in ensuring 
access to care for young adults. Advocates also argued that the ACA would encourage 
the use of preventative and primary care measures. We can use data on use of insurance 
and health services; post ACA, to gauge the success of the act in meeting its goals. 
                                                        
1 Subtitles C-F of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contain health insurance market reforms for all 
Americans, including the establishment of insurance exchanges.  
2 Sec. 2714 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148 
3 Rate refers to the rate of participation in health care insurance programs 
4 Dolgin & Dieterich report  5 court cases contesting the ACA, as well as challenges by the states and congress in 
their paper “The Social and Legal Debate About the Affordable Care Act.”  
5 Cost estimates come from the Congressional Budget Office’s cost projections for 2015-2025.  
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This information can better inform legislators and shape their decision-making moving 
forward with healthcare reform. It is also worth noting the effects that the legislation has  
had on the health practices of young adults.   
 Since the provision was enacted in 2010, there are three years of available data for 
young adults, which provides an opportunity for analysis. This opportunity is not 
available for analysis on other ACA provisions affecting the rest of the population, since 
most of the other major changes were not set to take place until 2014.  There has been 
minimal analysis on health outcomes resulting from the Affordable Care Act, because the 
act is still in it early stages.   
I plan to add to the literature by examining the use of primary care services 
specifically. Since increasing use of this type of care was a goal of the legislation this is 
where the focus of my analysis lies. Emergency room visits will be included as an 
outcome, because changes in E.R. use can be related to the use of primary and 
preventative care services6. I also add to the literature by including HPV vaccinations in 
my analysis. HPV vaccinations are recommended by physicians because of their 
effectiveness in preventing the onset of cervical cancer7. They are also targeted towards 
the young because HPV is a sexually transmitted disease, with higher rates in younger 
populations, who engage in more sexually risky behavior.  
Part I of the paper will precede with a literature review. Part II will contain 
information on my data and methodology. This will be followed by a presentation of 
results in Part III; with discussion and suggestion for further work following in Part IV.  
                                                        
6
 A relationship between E.R. visits and primary care has been suggested by Hernandez-Boussard et. al. as cited in my 
literature review.  
7
 Information on HPV Vaccinations was provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
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    Insurance and Health Behavior Literature Review 
 The literature thus far on insurance and its effect on health behaviors overall is 
inconclusive. Buchmueller et. al. compile literature on health insurance and primary care 
visits and find that insurance increases care by 1-2 visits per year. They also find that 
these increased visits lead to an increase in the utilization of preventative medical care 
(Buchmueller et. al., 2005). This would suggest that primary care visits would increase 
for groups gaining insurance coverage as a result of the ACA.  
Dave & Kaestner discuss the role of ex-ante moral hazard on health behavior in 
their 2009 paper. The theory of ex ante moral hazard reasons that after gaining insurance, 
individuals are more likely to act recklessly because costs of injury go down. The authors 
study the effect of gaining Medicare coverage on health behaviors and report that gaining 
coverage reduces prevention and increases risky health behavior among men (Dave & 
Kaestner, 2009). The authors originally propose that the effects of ex-ante moral hazard 
may be offset by increased access to medical knowledge through physician visits. If this 
were the case then the effects of ex-ante moral hazard would be small. The authors find a 
large increase in moral hazard for men suggesting that increased knowledge did not 
outweigh increases in risky behavior (Dave & Kaestner, 2009).  
 Courtemanche and Zapata tested the theory that increased access to insurance  
leads to lower reported health status. Increased access to health information through 
health professionals may cause individuals to be more skeptical about their health status. 
Individuals would then be less likely to consider themselves as being in good health. The 
authors find the opposite, with increased insurance leading to more individuals reporting 
excellent or very good health status after gaining insurance. They suggest these results 
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may be attributed to a warm glow effect experienced after acquiring insurance. In this 
scenario individuals may overstate their health status because having insurance provides 
them with a feeling of safety (Courtemanche & Zapata, 2013).  
 Differences in health behaviors across different gender, race, and education 
groups have also been examined in previous literature. Gender differences may occur 
because of differences in risk adversity. Jianakoplos and Bernasek study risk adversity, 
and find that women are more risk averse in their financial decisions than men. This 
suggests that women may exhibit higher rates of insurance coverage than men, and that 
women may have had higher rates of insurance pre-ACA than men (Jianakoplos & 
Bernasek, 1998). Bertakis et.al. find that women utilize health services more than men, 
and they spend more for health services (Bertakis et. al., 2000). Barbareso et. al. suggest 
this in their study of the ACA on preventative health measures. They predict males may 
not use care unless cost is low, so males would experience larger uptakes if coverage 
becomes more affordable (Barbaresco et. al., 2015).  
 Differences in education may signal different levels of access to a parent’s 
insurance plan. Barbaresco et. al. also suggest that those with college educations are more 
likely to have a parent with an insurance plan. If this is the case insurance gains resulting 
from the ACA would be observed for those with college educations. The authors also 
suggest that elasticity of medical care is the strongest for low-income individuals. If this 
is the case reductions in insurance costs would result in high uptakes by low-income 
individuals. This effect may be experienced by those without college educations and 
minorities (Barbaresco et. al., 2015). Minorities and those without college educations are  
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historically low-income groups8, which may lead them to experience high insurance 
uptakes, post-ACA.  
 These results are inconclusive on how we might expect the young population to 
react to insurance gains. The literature reviewed in the next section and my study both 
aim to provide more conclusive results on how young adults react with more affordable 
access to care. 
      Affordable Care Act Literature Review  
By extending health insurance to the young the ACA promised to increase 
insurance rates by making them more affordable for this group. Before the ACA, young 
people were often less likely to be insured for specific and identifiable reasons. The first 
being that most entry level jobs worked by those in their twenties do not offer health 
insurance; so not many adults in their twenties have access to health insurance through 
their employer. Without access through an employer, health insurance is often too costly 
for young people. Adults in their twenties often do not value insurance as much as adults 
in older age groups because they perceive themselves as being in good health. A 2006 
study by Park et.al. concluded that 37.7% of males and 30.7% of female’s aged 18-24 
were uninsured. The same study also concluded that this lack of insurance resulted in 
young adults foregoing care with 35.1% of males and 12.8% of females reporting that 
they had no contact with a health professional (Park et.al., 2006).   
Before the ACA required federal expansion, a number of states had adopted 
statutes that required insurance providers to expand coverage for young adults. A 2012 
study by Cantor et. al. reports that 31 states had already expanded young adult coverage. 
                                                        
8
 Information on historically low income and education groups was provided by the American Psychological 
Association  
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Despite having more access to insurance, however, Cantor et. al. report that states did not 
experience higher levels of insured young adults. This may be because state laws were 
less inclusive than federal law. Some expansions were restricted to young adults who 
were not married, and some did not apply to employer-funded plans (Cantor et. al., 
2012).  
Several papers have studied the ACA and increased insurance rates. They found 
that federal coverage expansions were more inclusive and led to higher rates of insurance 
for young adults. Cantor et. al. report a very rapid response of young adults to the policy 
with 716,000 young adults gaining coverage in 2010 alone (Cantor et.al., 2012).  
Sommers and Kronick report an 8.3% increase in coverage by 2012, which equated to 
about 2.5 million young adults (Sommers & Kronick, 2012). Cantor et. al. suggest that 
these results are attributable to the wide knowledge of the ACA, relative to the state 
expansions. They also suggest that because of the “weak economy” at the time more 
young adults were lacking jobs and attendant plans through their employers: and were 
eager to gain coverage through their parents as a result (Cantor et. al., 2012).  
 Results from Cantor et. al. suggest that the combination of expanded state  
coverage as well as expanded federal coverage suggest higher rates of insurance take-up. 
They suggest “state reforms ‘primed the pump’ for rapid take-up under the federal rules” 
(Cantor et. al., 2012). As a result those that were denied under state laws will gain 
coverage in large numbers over time as awareness increases (Cantor et. al., 2012)  
 Antwi et. al. study insurance effects of the ACA, separating out by type of private  
insurance. They find that young adults swapped out their own private, or employer 
sponsored insurance (ESI) plans, for their parents employer sponsored plans: with a 3.1% 
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decrease in own ESI and a 9.6% increase in parent ESI. They find higher rates of young 
adults switching to parent plans if their parents already had family plan coverage. In this 
case the cost of joining the parent plan is low. If the parents did not have a family plan, 
and had non-family coverage the costs of adding dependents is high (Antwi et. al., 2012). 
The secondhand effects of young adults becoming more insured have been 
studied in numerous papers. Marcus Dillender studied the labor market outcomes and 
found that higher insurance rates led to higher wages for young adults, because of the  
gains in human capital and increased labor market flexibility (Dillender, 2014).  
Three papers that studied the effects of higher insurance rates on cancer  
outcomes, inpatient visits, and mental health treatment reported various health outcomes 
for the young. Aizer et.al. concluded that higher rates of insurance coverage led to better 
outcomes for individuals with cancer, meaning decreased death rates and decreased 
presentation of disease (Aizer et. al., 2014). Saloner and Cook found that the expanded 
coverage lead to more young adults seeking treatment for mental illnesses (Saloner & 
Cook, 2014). A second study by Antwi et. al. found an increase of 3.5% of inpatient  
visits, which are hospital visits that do not occur through the E.R. They also find a 
increase of 9% for hospital mental health care visits, most of which do occur through the 
E.R. These results suggest that young adults are utilizing their expanded access to 
medical care. Antwi et. al. also find uninsured hospitalizations amongst young adults 
have declined 2.9% as a result of the ACA (Antwi et. al., 2013). 
Hernandez-Boussard et.al. found that the increased coverage decreased 
emergency room visits for the young (Hernandez-Boussard et. al., 2014). These improved 
health outcomes suggest my hypothesis of increased use of preventative care is plausible, 
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considering decreased use of hospital emergency rooms. High rates of emergency room 
visits are often associated with low insurance rates because it suggests that people are 
using the emergency room as their primary source of care, rather than seeing a doctor. 
Less emergency room visits may mean more trips to physicians, more knowledge about 
preventative care measures, and more use of preventative vaccines.  
In the most recent study conducted by Barbaresco et. al., preventative care  
measures, self-reported health, and risky behaviors are examined using data from the  
BRFSS9. They find that the ACA did result in more young adults having a primary care 
doctor, but improved access did not lead to increased utilization of preventative care. 
They examined changes in three preventative health care measures including flu shots, 
pap tests, and checkups, none of which were statistically significant. They report varying 
results for impact on risky behaviors, the most interesting of which is a reported increase 
in risky drinking. They attribute this to the theory of ex ante moral hazard proposed by 
Dave & Kaestner. The authors also find an increase in self-reported “excellent” health, 
and a reduction in body mass index (Barbaresco et. al., 2015).  
The literature thus far is suggesting increased rates of insurance among young 
adults as a result of the ACA. Improved health outcomes for the younger population have 
also been observed as a result of extended coverage indicating that increased access to 
healthcare is being utilized. The results found in the papers I have reviewed will be useful 
as I examine how extended coverage has affected health behaviors of the young. I will 
conduct a similar empirical analysis to those conducted in the reviewed papers, to test the 
                                                        
9
 BRFSS stands for Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance Survey, conducted yearly by the CDC.  
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hypothesis that use of care has increased. The results will have important policy 
implications on the debates surrounding the ACA, and will draw useful conclusions for 
policy makers and the young adult population.               
               Data  
Cross-sectional data comes from the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS), 
which compiles data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). The Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) conduct the NHIS yearly to ascertain health status, health 
behaviors, and demographic characteristics of the non-institutionalized population. The 
cross-sectional data has clear advantages. It contains both pre and post-ACA time 
periods, which is essential for the difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) analysis. It also 
contains measures of preventative and primary health such as doctor’s visits, screenings 
and vaccinations; as well as information on insurance status, and type of coverage. These 
are important variables in my analysis as they assess changes in insurance coverage and 
changes in health behavior.  
 I use two pre-ACA years, 2008 and 2009, in my model. I use three post-ACA  
years, 2011-2013. The IHIS data only goes through 2013. 2010 is excluded from the 
sample because insurance providers were not required to extend insurance to young 
adults until 2011. The three post-ACA years are separated out by respective year to 
analyze effects across time.   
I split observations of young adults into two groups based on age. A treatment  
group is formed with younger ages, and a comparison group formed with older ages.  
Treatment group selection has an important role in the analysis as the affected group, 
ages 19-25; vary depending on their age. Most importantly a number of young adults 
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aged 19-22 could be college students, and may have access to insurance as a result of 
their student status. Cantor et. al. exclude current students from their treatment sample of 
19-25 year olds (Cantor et. al, 2012). The IHIS data does not contain information on 
current student status. To account for this I use a treatment group of ages 23-25 as 
suggested by Barbaresco et.al. They suggest using a narrower age range, specifically 23-
25 year olds, because results are well defined for this group (Barbaresco et. al., 2015). 
Slusky also suggests the use of a narrower age range, after performing placebo tests on 
previous ACA diff-in-diff models. The models with broader age range failed placebo 
tests, suggesting a more narrow age range produces more robust results (Slusky, 2013). I 
use adults aged 27-29 as the comparison group, again following the model used by 
Barbaresco et. al (Barbaresco et. al., 2015). Adults aged 26 are removed from the sample 
as the IHIS data does not contain insurance status by month, or birth month of the 
participants. Without this information insurance status at age 26 cannot be ascertained, 
and may vary due to time of the year.  
I use eleven health-outcome dependent variables, which are all binary. One 
dependent variable indicates insurance status. Two outcomes report good health status, 
and improved health status relative to the year before. Health variables are self-reported 
and are included to ascertain the health status of the population, and to observe any 
changes in health status. The rest of the outcomes measure use of primary  
and preventative care services. Four variables are included for doctor’s visits, separating 
out by type of visit. These include general doctor, gynecologist, mental health, and 
therapist visits. Preventative care variables include flu shots, pap tests, and HPV 
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vaccinations. Emergency room visits are included, as changes in use of the emergency 
room may be related to the use of health services.         
I also include a number of controls in the model. Binary variables are included for 
sex, education level, race, region, and employment status. Education is split into two 
binary variables one for those who have attended college, and one for those who have 
not.10 Income is excluded from the model because of the small number of respondents. 
Results of all regressions including income as a control are included in the appendix for 
reference. Age and year fixed effects are also included in the model. The IHIS does not 
contain state variables, so state fixed effects are not included in the model.  
Table 1 contains summary statistics on all 11-outcome variables for 2008 and 
2009, separating out by treatment and comparison group. Sample sizes differ, as results 
from the IHIS are self-reported. Samples are also smaller for gynecologist visits and pap 
tests as these only contain results for the female sample. Means are similar across the two 
groups for 2008 and 2009 with the exception of insurance, HPV vaccinations, and pap 
tests. The younger sample is more likely to get HPV vaccinations, but less likely to have 
insurance and to get pap tests.  
    
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                        
10
 Degrees higher than undergraduate are not included as controls, some college is included in the college binary 
variable.  
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   Table 1: Pre-ACA Statistics for Outcome Variables   
 Treatment Comparison Diff. in 
Means 
T-Stat 
Variable 
 
Insurance Coverage 
Health Status 
Improved Health Status 
Emergency Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits 
Gynecologist Visits 
Mental Health Visits 
Therapist Visits  
Flu Shots 
HPV Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
mean      sd       obs 
 
0.68     0.01     6,299 
0.91     0.01     6,447 
0.78     0.01      691 
0.32     0.01     2,678 
0.59     0.01     2,430 
0.61     0.02     1,319 
0.10     0.11     2,432 
0.07    0.009    2,431 
0.13     0.01     2,420 
0.07     0.01     1,280 
0.91     0.01      590 
 mean      sd      obs 
 
0.72     0.006     6,381 
0.91     0.04       6,382 
0.78     0.006       735 
0.31     0.007     2,429 
0.60     0.007     2,681 
0.61     0.009     1,497 
0.11     0.004     2,683 
0.08     0.004     2,682 
0.14     0.005     2,674 
0.04     0.007     1,466 
0.94     0.006       646 
 
 
-0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
 0.00 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.05 
 
 
 
-6.98*** 
2.79*** 
0.95 
2.42*** 
-1.71* 
1.38 
-1.42 
-1.41 
-1.03 
6.04*** 
-4.18*** 
 
Notes: The sample size for pap tests is reduced because data is only available for 2008; Sd= standard 
deviation obs= observations; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the demographic binary variables, 
again separated out by treatment and comparison. Sample sizes differ significantly for 
income, resulting in income being excluded from the model. Means differ for marital 
status, with the younger group being less likely to be married. Means also vary for 
income with the older group making more each year on average.  
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         Table 2: Statistics for Demographic Variables  
Variable Treatment Comparison Diff. In 
Means 
T-Stat 
 
 
Black 
Hispanic 
Other Non-White 
Marital Status 
High School 
College 
Employment Status 
$0-$10,000 
$10,000-$25,000 
$25,000-$55,000 
$55,000-$75,000 
>$75,000 
Female 
Northeast  
West 
Midwest 
South 
 
mean    sd     obs 
 
0.15   0.36   51,190 
0.29   0.45   51,190 
0.09   0.29   51,190 
0.29   0.45   50,792 
0.27   0.44   51,190 
0.28   0.44   51,190 
0.90   0.28   41,057 
0.21   0.41   29,109 
0.43   0.49   29,109 
0.31   0.46   29,109 
0.02   0.14   29,109 
0.008 0.08   29,109 
0.51   0.49   51,190 
0.15   0.36   51,190 
0.28   0.45   51,190 
0.20   0.40   51,190 
0.35   0.47   51,190 
 
mean    sd     obs 
 
0.14   0.35   51,113 
0.29   0.45   51,113 
0.09   0.29   51,113 
0.50   0.49   50,753 
0.25   0.43   51,113 
0.30   0.45   51,113 
0.93   0.25   42,144 
0.12   0.33   31,638 
0.31   0.46   31,638 
0.44   0.49   31,638 
0.07   0.26   31,638 
0.03   0.19   31,638 
0.52   0.49   51,113 
0.15   0.35   51,113 
0.28   0.45   51,113 
0.20   0.40   51,113 
0.36   0.48   51,113 
 
0.01 
0.005 
-0.004 
-0.208 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.03 
0.09 
0.12 
-0.18 
-0.05 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.003 
-0.001 
0.003 
0.01 
 
        3.81*** 
1.95* 
-2.26*** 
-69.84*** 
7.21*** 
-6.37*** 
-12.24*** 
29.71*** 
30.80*** 
-32.91*** 
-30.06*** 
-25.90*** 
3.51*** 
1.34 
-0.37 
1.20 
1.67* 
Notes: se=standard deviation, obs= observation; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
  
Table 3 reports the means in outcome variables for treatment and comparison 
groups, in the pre-ACA and post-ACA periods. The diff-in-diff means are also 
calculated. In the pre-period the treatment group had lower insurance, than the 
comparison group. The treatment group received more HPV vaccinations, but had lower 
average rates of primary care visits than the comparison group in the pre-period. The diff-
in-diff means are significant and positive for insurance and HPV vaccinations, but not 
significant for any of the other primary care measures.                                
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    Table 3: Means for Outcome Variables 
Variable Pre-Period  Post-Period  Diff-in-Diff T-Stat 
 Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison   
 
 
Insurance Coverage 
Good Health 
Improved Health Status 
Emergency Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits 
Gynecologist Visits 
Mental Health Visits 
Therapist Visits 
Flu Shots 
HPV Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
 
mean  sd  obs 
 
0.68  0.01    6,299 
0.91  0.01    6,447 
0.78  0.01     691 
0.32  0.01    2,678 
0.59  0.01    2,430 
0.61  0.02    1,319 
0.10  0.11    2,433 
0.07  0.009  2,431 
0.13  0.01    2,420 
0.07  0.01    1,280 
0.91  0.01     590 
 
 
mean  sd  obs 
 
0.72  0.006   6,381 
0.91   0.04    6,382 
0.78  0.006    735 
0.31  0.007   2,429 
0.60  0.007   2,681 
0.61  0.009   1,497 
0.11  0.004   2,683 
0.08  0.004   2,682 
0.14  0.005   2,674 
0.04  0.007   1,466 
0.94  0.006     646 
 
 
mean  sd  obs 
 
0.74  0.04  50,420 
0.89  0.03  51,062 
0.81  0.03   5,487 
0.30  0.04  20,950 
0.57  0.04  20,942 
0.57  0.06  11,476 
0.13  0.03  20,952 
0.06  0.02  20,959 
0.22  0.03  20,302 
0.14  0.03  7,428 
0.85 0.05   4,654 
 
mean     sd     obs 
 
0.81  0.02  50,527 
0.89  0.01  51,014 
0.82  0.01   5,838 
0.29  0.01  22,342 
0.57  0.02  22,332 
0.58  0.02  12,419 
0.13  0.01  22,361 
0.07  0.02  22,355 
0.24  0.01  21,676 
0.08  0.01  8,304 
0.92  0.05  5,193 
 
 
       0.09 
    -0.005 
    -0.005 
      0.005 
      0.006 
      -0.02 
      0.006 
      0.004 
      -0.01 
       0.03 
      -0.04 
 
 
4.98*** 
 -0.04 
 -0.35 
  0.28 
  0.28 
 -0.88 
  0.46 
  0.37 
 -0.58 
  1.74* 
 -1.38 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%; se= standard deviation, obs= 
observations; pap tests only contain data for 2008 and 2013.  
 
Trends in the outcome variables for the treatment and comparison groups for pre 
and post ACA years are presented graphically in Figure 111. Treatment and comparison 
group similarity is important in my analysis, as my comparison group demonstrates how 
the treatment group would have behaved had it not been treated. Trends for the treatment 
and comparison group are similar before 2010 for the outcomes shown in Figure 1, 
reassuring my choice of comparison group. If the ACA changed the behavior of the 
treatment group, we would expect trends between the two groups to differ after 2010. 
Trends between the two groups remain similar in the post period for most variables 
included in Figure 1, with the exception of insurance and HPV vaccinations. These 
results are similar to those observed above from Table 3. I now turn to regression analysis 
                                                        
11
 I include graphs with well-defined means differing between the treatment and comparison groups. Graphs for 
outcome variables were omitted if means were two similar as the lines were situated on top of one another, resulting in 
graphs that were difficult to read.  
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to observe changes in the treatment group post-ACA, after having controlled for some 
important variables that could lead to selection in the age groups over time.  
  Model 
I use a diff-in-diff analysis to estimate the effect of the ACA on my 11 health 
related outcomes. The diff-in-diff will account for changes in the treatment group as a 
result of the provision, relative to the comparison group. The first difference controls for 
changes that are constant over time within the treatment group. The first difference is 
then the mean outcome of the treatment group in the after period subtracted by the mean 
outcome of the treatment group in the before period.  
                    (  

 
  
 
The second difference controls for changes in the dependent variables over time by using 
a comparison group not affected by the provision. This is the mean outcome for the 
comparison group in the post-period subtracted by the mean outcome for the control 
group in the pre-period.  
           ( 

 

  
Including both the first and second differences gives us the differences between the 
before and after periods, and the differences between those affected by the provision and 
those not affected. Subtracting between the first and second differences results in the 
difference in means between the treatment and comparison group, in the post period.  
              ( 

  
 
 – ( 

  

 ) 
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A main assumption of the analysis is that the two groups would have observed 
similar trends if the policy had not been implemented. This assumption is adopted to 
account for the concern that differences between the treatment and comparison group in 
the post period may not be attributable to the policy, but to underlying differences 
occurring between the two groups. If the two groups observed similar trends before the 
policy, then any changes in trends after the policy are likely a result of policy changes 
(Gertler et. al., 2011). It is impossible to test the parallel trends assumption, however if 
the treatment and comparison groups had similar trends before, then the comparison 
group is hopefully a good indicator for how the treatment group would have behaved had 
it not been treated. The parallel trends assumption cannot be tested because there is no 
way to measure how the treatment group would have behaved had they not been treated. 
The validity of this assumption can be tested graphically, demonstrated by graphs in 
Figure 1.  
The parallel trends assumption can also be tested through regression analysis. To 
test the parallel trends assumption I run a diff-and-diff regression for all of my outcome 
variables using only pre-ACA years. I use 2006 and 2007 as my pre years, and 2008 and 
2009 as my post years. I use the same treatment group and comparison groups that I use 
in my ACA model. The regression used to test the parallel lines assumption is: 
                          	
       +
       
 
Where 	
 represents outcome “y” for individual “i” at time “t” in region “r.” 
measures the mean difference between the treatment and comparison group in the trend 
period. Treat would only be a 1 for those in the treatment group, and trend would only be 
a 1 for trend years 2008 or 2009. If the parallel trends assumption is valid we would not 
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expect the coefficient on to be statistically significant. If the coefficient on  is 
significant this would suggest differing trends in 2008 and 2009. If the coefficient on  
is not significant it would suggest similar trends in 2008 and 2009, which would give 
validity to the parallel trends assumption. 
 is a vector of demographic and regional 
variables.  represents age fixed effects and  represents year fixed effects. !
 is the 
error term. Table 4 presents the results from the trend regression.12 None of the 
coefficients on the outcome variables are statistically significant. These results add 
validity to the parallel trends assumption because trends were similar for outcome 
variables in the years leading up to the ACA.   
I use the following regression model to estimate the diff-in-diff treatment effect 
for my post-ACA years: 
 
where 	
 represents a health outcome for individual “i” of age “g” at time “t” in region 
“r”. Treat is binary variable representing the treatment group, with a 1 representing those 
aged 23-25 and 0 for ages 27-29. The three-year binary variables represent three post-
ACA years, with the variable being a 1 only for the labeled year. 
 is a vector of 
demographic and regional variables that controls for changes in health behaviors 
attributable to demographic and regional differences. " represents age-fixed effects, and 
 represents year fixed effects. Age-fixed effects are included to control for underlying 
differences between the two groups.
                                                        
12 Results for HPV vaccinations are not included because data on HPV vaccinations only goes back to 2008. Results for 
pap tests are also not included because there is only available data for 2008 and 2013.   
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Table 4: Trend Regression Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn. Visits Mental Health 
Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots 
 
Treat*Trend 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
-0.01     -0.00 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.00     0.006 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.06**  0.06** 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01      0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.01      0.13 
 
N            Y 
 
2,713    2,164 
 
-0.01     0.004 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.01     -0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
-0.002   -0.02 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.005    -0.01 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.002     0.02 
 
N            Y 
 
2,720   2,167 
 
0.005   -0.006 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
  -             - 
 
 
-0.007  -0.005 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.03    -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02    -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.001   0.009 
 
N            Y 
 
2,720    2,167 
  
-0.03    -0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
  -             - 
 
 
-0.01   -0.04* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.04      0.05 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.003  -0.005 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.004    0.05 
 
N           Y 
 
2,695   2,146 
 
 
-0.04    -0.05 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
 -             - 
 
 
-0.01     0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.02     0.07** 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.02      0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.002    0.05 
 
N           Y 
 
2,698   2,148 
 
0.08     0.003 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
0.06*   0.07* 
(0.03) (0.04) 
  
0.01     0.06 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.01     0.08* 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
0.008   0.04 
 
N          Y 
 
1,561  1,148 
 
-0.009    0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-            - 
 
 
0.01       0.02 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.04**   0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01       0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.005    0.05 
 
N            Y 
 
2,702   2,151 
 
 
-0.005  -0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
-            - 
 
 
0.002  0.003 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
0.01     0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
0.001   0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
0.001   0.009 
 
N           Y 
 
2,701   2,150 
 
0.04         0.02 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.04***0.06*** 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.04*     0.06** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.08*** 0.11*** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01        0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
2,684     2,138 
       Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%; pap tests and HPV vaccinations are excluded because they don’t 
contain data for  years before 2008. 
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Year fixed effects are included for a similar reason, to control for underlying 
differences occurring between the pre and post-ACA periods. I was not able to include 
state fixed effects in my model because the IHIS data does not contain information on 
state. Binary variables for post-period and for the treatment group are not included 
because of collinearity with the fixed effects terms.  
 is the error term. The diff-in-diff 
estimators are the coefficients , , $. The interaction on these coefficients would only 
be 1 for an individual in the treatment group, in the post period.  
   Results 
Table 4 presents results from my baseline model. I report regression results with 
and without controls. At the bottom of the table I also report, the pre-treatment mean in 
order to determine the percent change in the outcome variables. The results suggest a 
large impact of the ACA on insurance rates for the treatment group. Insurance rates for 
23-25 year olds increased by between 10-13 percentage points. It appears that the largest 
gains for this group occurred in the first two years of insurance availability, suggesting 
young adults experienced rapid uptake. This uptake represents a 14-19% increase in 
insurance for the treatment group.  
Year fixed effects show statistically significant declines in the mean insurance 
rate for the sample population as a whole. Declining insurance rates for the whole 
population sample may result in increases in insurance for the treatment group being 
slightly overstated, but adding year fixed-effects controls for this possibility.  
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Table 5: ACA Regression Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
E.R. 
Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn.  
Visits 
Mental 
Health 
Visits 
Therapist  
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre- Treat 
Mean 
0.05 ***0.12*** 
(0.01)   (0.04) 
 
0.12***  0.13*** 
(0.01)   (0.03) 
 
0.08 ** 0.10*** 
(0.01)   (0.04) 
 
 -               - 
             
 
-0.07 ***-0.04*  
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.10***-0.07*** 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.11*** -0.07** 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03    -0.05* 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01        0.13 
 
N             Y 
  
4,224     3,404 
 
      0.68 
       
0.008     0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
  
0.02      0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.01    -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
  -            - 
 
 
0.008    0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
-0.01    -0.02 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
-0.01  - 0.001 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
-0.004 -0.008 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
0.001    0.02 
 
N             Y 
 
4,339    3,416 
 
      0.91 
      
-0.02      0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01      0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03     -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
  
  -             - 
 
 
 0.01       0.01 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
0.02       0.04 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
  
0.04*   0.05** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.06**0.07*** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.003     0.01 
 
N              Y 
 
4,240     3,417 
 
       0.78 
      
0.07*    0.04 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.03      0.02 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.04     0.04 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.04**-0.05** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02     -0.05* 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01     -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03      -0.04 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.004     0.06 
 
N            Y 
 
4,197   3,379 
 
     0.32 
 
0.07*      0.06 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
0.01       -0.001 
(0.04)     (0.04) 
 
0.05        0.05 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.007      -0.01 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
-0.06**  -0.06* 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
-0.04       -0.04 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
-0.02       -0.06 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
0.004         0.05 
 
N               Y 
 
4,196       3,379 
 
        0.59 
        
0.01     0.08 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.01   -0.009 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.08     -0.03 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
  -             - 
 
 
 -0.01     0.03 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
-0.01    -0.02 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.07*  -0.06 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.01     -0.03 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.008    0.02 
 
N            Y 
 
2,321   1,734 
 
       0.61 
 
0.03     0.008 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
-0.001   -0.001 
(0.02)    (0.03) 
 
0.02       0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
  -            - 
 
 
-0.03*    -0.02     
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
0.00      -0.02 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01      -0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.002     -0.03 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
0.002    0.04 
 
N            Y 
 
4,205  3,385 
 
       .10 
 
-0.006   0.003 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.008    0.00 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.01      0.01 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
  -             - 
          
 
-0.008    -0.01 
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
-0.006     0.00 
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
-0.008    -0.01 
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
-0.01      -0.02 
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
0.0008    0.01 
 
N            Y 
 
4,204    3,384 
 
        .07  
      
-0.01    -0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.009   0.009 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.05 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
 -            - 
 
 
0.03   0.05*** 
(.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.07 0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.06      0.05* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.06      0.05* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.0004   0.03 
 
N            Y 
   
4,179   3,365 
 
      0.13 
      
 
0.04        0.02 
(0.02)    (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.008 
(0.02)    (0.03) 
 
 0.01      0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-         0.07*** 
          (0.02) 
 
-0.01  0.13*** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
0.00   0.14*** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
0.05***0.19*** 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.02      0.09 
 
N            Y 
 
3,473    2,765 
 
      0.07 
      
 -               - 
 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.01      -0.02 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
   -              - 
 
    
    -             - 
   
      
    -             - 
 
 
   -         0.007 
             (0.01) 
 
0.02        0.09 
 
N              Y 
 
3,144    2,422 
 
       .91  
      
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Data for pap tests only contains one pre year (2009) and one post year (2013); 
Control variables include all demographic variables from Table 2, with the exception of income
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Year fixed effects are also significant and positive for HPV vaccinations starting in 2009, 
showing increases in HPV vaccinations for the sample population as a whole. The HPV 
vaccination is only required once, so if young adults received the vaccination in 2009, 
they would not need to vaccination again in the following years. This may be why young 
adults did not experience significant increases in the use of HPV vaccinations in the post-
ACA period.  
The coefficients on doctor’s visits in 2011 and 2013 were not statistically 
significant, but represented large increases in doctor’s visits for young adults. The 
treatment group increased their doctor’s visits by 6 percentage points in 2011 and 5 
percentage points in 2013, representing increases in doctor’s visits of 10% in 2011 and 
8% in  2013. Despite this increase, most of the coefficients for preventative care were not 
statistically significant. It may be that doctors are not giving preventative care for some 
reason; maybe flu shots and HPV vaccinations are not covered under plans, or have large 
co-pays. These care measures may need to be free for the treatment group to use them, as 
the treatment group is relatively healthy and low-income.  
The treatment group did not experience a statistically significant increase in pap 
tests in any of the post periods, which is not surprising as pap test mean for the treatment 
group was high in the pre-ACA period, so there was little room for improvement. The 
treatment group also experienced no statistically significant changes in health status post-
ACA. This is not surprising as the mean on health status for the treatment group was also 
high in the pre-ACA period.  
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                                      Heterogeneity Results 
I run stratifications by gender, education level, and race. Barbaresco et. al. suggest 
this approach as different groups may not only have different gains in coverage; but they 
may also respond differently to gains in coverage (Barbaresco et. al., 2015). 
 I include two gender stratifications, excluding outcomes for pap tests and  
gynecologist visits because males do not require either. I only include two education 
stratifications for those with college, and those with high school diplomas or GED             
certificates but no-college. Race stratifications are included for Blacks and Hispanics. 
Results from the heterogeneity regressions are presented in Tables 6-12. I keep the same 
treatment and comparison groups, as well as the same pre and post-ACA periods. 
Statistically significant increases in insurance coverage for both the male and female 
treatment groups are observed in the post-ACA period. Both groups experienced 
insurance gains over all three post-ACA years, with not much variation between the two 
groups. Most of the results for primary care use were not statistically significant for both 
groups. Males did exhibit a 14-percentage point increase in doctor’s visits and a 11-
percentage point increase in flu shots in 2013. Males may be utilizing their expanded 
coverage more than women, but it took them a few years after gaining coverage to do so.    
Individuals without college degrees experienced increases in insurance coverage over 
all three post-ACA years, while those with college degrees only experienced increased 
coverage in 2012. Those without college degrees experienced a larger uptake in coverage, 
giving evidence to Barbaresco et. al.’s theory of higher gains for lower incomes. Those  
without college degrees increased doctor’s visits in 2013 by 20 percentage points, but 
decreased gynecologist visits by 29 percentage points. 
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Table 6: Results from Female Heterogeneity Test 
 Insurance  
Coverage 
Good 
Health 
Improved 
Health 
Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s  
Visits 
Mental 
Health 
Visits 
 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean 
 
 
 
0.12***    0.11** 
(0.05)     (0.05) 
 
0.21***  0.18*** 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.05          0.09* 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
  -                   -  
 
 
-0.09*** -0.07** 
(0.03)      (0.03) 
 
-0.04     -0.09*** 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.06     -0.10*** 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.06*      -0.06* 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
    
0.02 0.10 
  
 
N                 Y 
 
 
2,339    1,750 
 
          0.71 
 
0.01      0.006 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.03        0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.007   0.009 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
  -                 - 
   
 
0.01       0.03 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.001   0.008 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.00      0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.009     0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.002     0.03 
 
 
N               Y 
 
 
2,343   1,753 
 
         0.94 
 
 
 
-0.04      0.01 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.008    0.04 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.02     0.001 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
  
   -                  -   
              
 
0.02        0.03 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.06*      0.07* 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.06*      0.07* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.08***0.09*** 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.007     0.02 
 
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,344     1.754 
 
          0.81 
 
 
0.05        0.01 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.01     -0.03 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.01        0.02 
(0.05)   (0.06 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.03       -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
   
0.003      0.02 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.01   -0.009 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.04     -0.05 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.008     0.06 
 
  
N               Y 
 
 
2,323    1,736 
 
          0.25 
 
 
 
0.07        0.05 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.003  -0.001 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.02     -0.02 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
    -                 - 
 
 
0.008     0.005 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.05      -0.03 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.04      -0.04 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.007     0.003 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.007     0.03 
 
 
N               Y 
 
 
2,324    1,737 
 
         0.57 
 
0.02      -0.01 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.05     -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.01    -0.004 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
 -                   - 
 
 
-0.05**   -0.04 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01        -0.02 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.04        -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.02        -0.05 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.005     0.06 
 
  
N               Y 
 
 
2,327    1,738 
 
         0.09 
 
0.07**     0.07** 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.01        0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.02         0.02 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.00      -0.004 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.04***-0.04* 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02      -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.01      -0.02 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.004       0.01 
 
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,327     1,738 
 
         0.05 
 
-0.03      -0.08 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.008       0.03 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.009     0.04 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
0.02          0.05 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.08** 0.12*** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.07**     0.06 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.08**  0.09** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.006      0.02 
 
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,312    1,726 
 
        0.26 
 
 
0.08***     0.06 
(0.03)     (0.04) 
 
0.05          0.05 
(0.03)     (0.04) 
 
0.04          0.05 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
0.05***    0.07*** 
(0.01)     (0.02) 
 
0.02          0.10*** 
(0.02)      (0.02) 
 
0.05**      0.11*** 
(0.02)      (0.02) 
 
0.12***   0.18*** 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.05            0.07 
 
 
N                    Y 
 
 
2,255         1,690 
 
            0.25 
                            Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;Gynecologist visits and pap tests are omitted 
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Table 7: Results from Male Heterogeneity Test 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Mental Health 
Visits  
Therapist  
Visits  
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean 
 
0.13**0.16*** 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.12**  0.10* 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.11**0.13*** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
-0.05    -0.008 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.04      -0.04 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.04     -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.02     -0.05 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.008      0.17 
 
N               Y 
 
1,885    1,654 
 
         0.64 
 
 
0.000      0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.03      0.007 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
  
-0.02      -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
-0.002     -0.01 
(0.01)    (0.01) 
 
-0.02     -0.05** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.03      -0.03* 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02     -0.03* 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.006      0.03 
 
N               Y 
 
1,896     1,663 
 
         0.94 
 
 
 
0.003       0.02 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.01      -0.004 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
-0.05      -0.06 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
0.00         -0.01 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
0.005      -0.002 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
0.04        0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.05        0.05 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.005      0.03 
 
N                Y 
 
1,896     1,663 
 
         0.81 
 
0.08        0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.08         0.08 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.08        0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.07** -0.09*** 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.12***-0.13*** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.08** -0.09** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.09**-0.10*** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.008     0.05 
 
N              Y 
  
1,874      1,643 
 
          0.25 
 
0.06       0.07 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.02       0.007 
(0.06)   (0.06) 
 
0.15***  0.14** 
(0.06)    (0.06) 
 
   -                   - 
 
 
-0.02        -0.04 
(0.04)     (0.04) 
 
-0.09*     -0.10* 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
-0.04        -0.02 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
-0.07        -0.08* 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
0.02 0.04 
 
N                 Y 
 
1,872       1,642 
 
          0.57 
 
 
0.04         0.03 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
0.06         0.03 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
0.05         0.03 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
-0.00      0.005 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
-0.01        -0.01 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
-0.01       -0.009 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
-0.02        -0.02 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
0.007        0.02 
 
N                 Y 
 
1,878       1,647 
 
         0.09 
 
 
-0.07** -0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.01    -0.008 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.002       0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.02     -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.04       0.03 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.005    0.003 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.008    -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.006     0.03 
 
N               Y 
 
1,877    1,347 
 
        0.05 
 
0.001     -0.01 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.03       0.01 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.04      0.11** 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
0.06**      0.03 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.07*       0.06 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.06*       0.01 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.04        -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.008      0.02 
 
N                Y 
 
1,867     1,342 
 
         0.26 
 
-             -0.001 
               (0.03) 
 
-0.009    -0.01 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.01            - 
(0.02) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
 -                 - 
 
 
-         -0.05*** 
          (0.01) 
 
0.003  -0.03** 
(0.009)(0.01) 
 
0.03***      - 
(0.01) 
 
0.02 0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,218      884 
 
         0.25 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Gynecologist visits and pap tests are omitted 
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Table 8: No-College Heterogeneity Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved  
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
Year 2008 
 
 
Year 2009 
 
 
Year 2011 
 
 
Year 2012 
 
 
Year 2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean 
 
0.18**    0.19** 
(0.08)   (0.09) 
 
0.24***0.18** 
(0.08) (0.09) 
 
0.15*      0.19** 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
-0.09*     -0.05 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.13**   -0.07 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
-0.19***  -0.09 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
-0.13** -0.15** 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
0.02 0.07 
 
N                Y 
 
956          755 
 
        0.59 
 
 
0.02        0.01 
(0.06)    (0.06) 
 
-0.003    -0.04 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.06       -0.08 
(0.06)    (0.06) 
 
  -                    - 
 
 
0.01         0.02 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
-0.06       -0.05 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
0.00          0.03 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
-0.004    -0.007 
(0.04)    (0.04)  
 
0.009       0.04 
 
N                Y 
 
960         759 
 
        0.92 
 
-0.02         -0.02 
(0.07)     (0.07) 
 
-0.08         -0.07 
(0.07)     (0.07) 
 
-0.05        -0.07 
(0.07)     (0.07) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.001      0.01 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
0.004         0.07 
(0.06)     (0.06) 
 
0.09*        0.10* 
(0.05)     (0.06) 
 
0.07        0.12** 
(0.05)     (0.06)  
 
0.009         0.05 
 
N                  Y 
 
961           760 
 
        0.80 
 
 
 
0.04         0.03 
(0.08)   (0.09) 
 
0.008      0.01 
(0.08)   (0.09) 
 
0.04          0.11 
(0.08)   (0.09) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
-0.09*   -0.11* 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.08       -0.05 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
-0.14**   -0.12 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
-0.09   -0.15** 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
0.02 0.07 
 
N              Y 
 
951       751 
 
       0.27 
 
0.08       0.05 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.06         0.10 
(0.08)   (0.10) 
  
0.21***0.20** 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
 -                 - 
 
 
0.01       0.003 
(0.05)   (0.07) 
 
-0.05      -0.04 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.04       -0.10 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.12 *  -0.16* 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
0.02 0.03 
 
N               Y 
 
953        753 
 
        0.46 
 
 
0.05         0.05 
(0.12)    (0.14) 
 
-0.16       -0.19 
(0.11)    (0.14) 
 
-0.21*   -0.29** 
(0.12)   (0.14) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.02         0.04 
(0.07)    (0.09) 
 
-0.08        -0.03 
(0.09)     (0.11) 
 
-0.09       -0.04 
(0.09)     (0.12) 
 
0.07          0.17 
(0.09)    (0.11) 
 
0.05        0.09 
 
N               Y 
 
486         345 
 
         0.50 
 
0.06        0.05 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.003   0.002 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.07         0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
 -                   - 
 
 
-0.03      -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.05      -0.03 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.01       0.001 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.07* -0.09** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.02 0.05 
 
N               Y 
 
954        754 
 
       0.07 
 
 
-0.05   -0.10** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.02      0 .002 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.02       0.009 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.01      -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.06       0.07* 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.005   -0.03 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.004     -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.02 0.04 
  
N             Y 
 
954       754 
 
       0.03 
 
-0.16***-0.17** 
(0.07)   (0.07) 
 
0.007      0.03 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
0.01        0.009 
(0.07)    (0.07) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
0.05          0.08* 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
0.19*** 0.20*** 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
0.14***   0.10* 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
 
0.07          0.08 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
 
0.02       0.04 
 
N               Y 
 
949         750 
 
         0.18 
 
0.06        0.06 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.03        0.04 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.07        0.02 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
  
  -                 - 
 
 
-.008      -0.03 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.01      -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.03       0.008 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.02         0.04 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.02 0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
775      602 
 
       0.08 
 
 
 -                 - 
 
 
 -                - 
  
 
-0.02  -0.005 
(0.04)(0.05) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
  -                 - 
  
 
  -                 - 
 
 
   -                - 
 
 
-0.03  -0.007 
(0.02)(0.03) 
 
0.02     0.06 
 
N             Y 
 
673        486 
  
        0.83 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; No college represents those with high school diplomas or GED certificates but 
not college educations 
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Table 9: College Heterogeneity Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Gyn. Visits Mental Health 
Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
Year 2008 
 
 
Year 2009 
 
 
Year 2011 
 
 
Year 2012 
 
 
Year 2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean 
 
 
 
0.02       0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
0.11**    0.13*** 
(0.05)    (0.08) 
  
0.01         0.04 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
 
  -                    - 
 
 
-0.03       -0.01 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
-0.04        -0.03 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
-0.05        -0.06 
(0.04)     (0.04) 
 
-0.005     -0.02 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
0.02 0.09 
 
N                Y 
 
1,418     1,220 
 
         0.85 
 
-0.02     -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.01     -0.001 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01     -0.001 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.01        0.01 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.01       0.003 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02     -0.004 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02      -0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.02 0.03 
 
N              Y 
 
1,423   1,222 
 
        0.96 
 
 
 
-0.08     -0.06 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.02       0.01 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
-0.008   -0.01 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
    -                - 
 
 
-0.009  0.002 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.08       0.08 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.05       0.07 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.06      0.07* 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
N              Y 
 
1,423   1,222 
 
        0.85 
 
 
 
 
0.08       0.05 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.04       0.02 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.02       0.03 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
  -                  - 
  
 
-0.01    -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.06    -0.06 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.01     -0.02 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.04     -0.04 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.007     0.04 
 
N               Y 
 
1,410   1,211 
 
         0.15 
 
0.16*** 0.18*** 
(0.07)   (0.07) 
 
0.06        0.03 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
 
0.06        0.10 
(0.07)   (0.07) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
0.004     -0.02 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.08     -0.11* 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
-0.07     -0.08 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.01      -0.05 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.008     0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,409    1,210 
 
         0.56 
 
 
 
-0.01      0.06 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
 
0.002   0.005 
(0.09) (0.10) 
 
-0.03     0.01 
(0.09)  (0.11) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
0.05       0.06 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.02      -0.01 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
 
-0.02     -0.008 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
-0.05      -0.07 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
0.02 0.05 
 
N               Y 
 
799        666 
 
         0.53 
 
-0.004    0.03 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.003    0.02 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.02    -0.002 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
   -                   - 
 
 
-0.004  -0.007 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.008    -0.03 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.03      -0.05 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.004    -0.01 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.008    0.04 
 
N             Y 
 
1,413   1,212 
 
        0.10 
 
0.08** 0.08* 
(0.03)(0.04) 
 
0.03      0.03 
(0.04)(0.04) 
 
0.03      0.05 
(0.03)(0.04) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.004    0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
-0.03    -0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01      0.03 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.02     -0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.009    0.02 
  
N             Y 
 
1,412   1,211 
 
         0.04 
 
0.00      0.003 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
  
-0.07    -0.008 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.04       0.13* 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
   -                - 
  
 
0.04       0.04 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.09*    0.07 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.10**   0.05 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.06      0.03 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.009    0.02 
 
N             Y 
 
1,400   1,203 
 
        0.25 
 
 
 
0.08      0.07 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.03      0.04 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.05      0.07 
(0.06) (0.06) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
0.11***0.12*** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.04       0.05* 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.07***  0.07** 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.13*** 0.11*** 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.05       0.06 
 
N               Y 
 
1,179   1,012 
 
         0.21 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
-0.03      -0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
    -                - 
 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
0.01       0.03* 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
0.03       0.11 
 
N               Y 
 
1,121      954 
 
        0.83 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 28
Table 10: Black Heterogeneity Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean 
 
0.16         0.17 
(0.09)    (0.11) 
  
0.26***  0.22*** 
(0.09)   (0.10) 
 
0.08         0.09 
(0.09)   (0.10) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
-0.15*** -0.12** 
(0.05)    (0.06) 
 
-0.17***-0.20*** 
(0.07)    (0.07) 
 
-0.19*** -0.15** 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
-0.08        -0.10 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
0.03          0.07 
 
N                Y 
 
708         570 
 
          0.66 
 
 
 
0.03         0.01 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
-0.04      -0.02 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
-0.08      -0.03 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
0.05        0.04 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.02      0.01 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.05        0.06 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.07       0.02 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
N               Y 
 
712       574 
 
        0.91 
 
-0.12    -0.12 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
-0.09     -0.11 
(0.08)  (0.08) 
 
-0.10     -0.15* 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
0.05       0.03 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.02        0.05 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.06        0.09 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.09*      0.12* 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.02 0.03 
 
N              Y 
 
712        574 
 
       0.76 
 
-0.15    -0.11 
(0.10)  (0.12) 
 
-0.05    -0.10 
(0.09)  (0.11) 
 
-0.03     -0.02 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.10*   -0.09 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.07       0.05 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
-0.13*    -0.05 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
-0.05      -0.06 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
  
0.03        0.05 
 
N               Y 
 
708        570 
 
        0.30 
 
 
 
0.11        0.16 
(0.10)   (0.11) 
 
0.08        0.07 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
 
0.004      0.03 
(0.10)   (0.11) 
  
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.03     -0.02 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.15** -0.16* 
(0.07)  (0.09) 
 
-0.17** -0.16* 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
-0.03     -0.06 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
0.02      0.05 
 
N              Y 
  
708       570 
 
       0.49 
 
 
0.004   0.05 
(0.12) (0.14) 
 
-0.09    -0.14 
(0.12)  (0.14) 
 
0.09       0.11 
(0.13)  (0.15) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.04      0.03 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
0.02       0.03 
(0.09) (0.11) 
 
-0.05    -0.005 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
 
-0.05     -0.06 
(0.09)  (0.11) 
 
0.02 0.04 
 
N             Y 
 
437     344 
 
        0.55 
 
0.06        0.01 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
 
-0.001   -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.06       0.03 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
    
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.007    0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.07 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.03       0.03 
(0.05)  (0.04) 
 
-0.05      -0.02 
(0.04)  (0.03) 
 
0.02 0.06 
 
N              Y 
 
708        570 
 
        0.06 
 
0.02       -0.009 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
0.07        0.01 
(0.06)   (0.06) 
 
0.01        0.01 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.04     -0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.03   -0.007 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
-0.05     -0.02 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.04     -0.05 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.006    0.02 
 
N              Y 
 
708       570 
 
         0.05 
 
-0.05      -0.13 
(0.08)   (0.09) 
 
-0.03     -0.07 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.01       0.02 
(0.09)   (0.10) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.03        0.07 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.06       0.08 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.06       0.07 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.10       0.07 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.009    0.03 
 
N              Y 
 
702      565 
 
        0.21 
 
0.09        0.06 
(0.06)   (0.06) 
 
-0.007   -0.10* 
(0.06)   (0.06) 
 
0.003    -0.03 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
0.05       0.03 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.004     0.02 
(0.03)  (0.02) 
 
0.07*     0.09*** 
(0.04)  (0.03) 
 
0.12***  0.15*** 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.03       0.06 
    
N              Y 
 
598       479 
 
        0.14 
 
 
   -                 - 
 
  
   -                 - 
  
 
-0.004    -0.04 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.01      -0.004 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
0.02         0.05 
 
N                 Y 
 
586          469 
 
         0.87 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11: Hispanic Heterogeneity Results 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre-Treat Mean  
 
0.24*** 0.23*** 
(0.08)  (0.08) 
 
0.18***  0.14 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.24*** 0.25*** 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
0.01        0.03 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.06      -0.01 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
-0.08     -0.02 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
-0.07      -0.10 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
0.02 0.10 
  
N              Y 
 
1,086     841 
 
        0.51 
 
0.01      0.006 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.02       0.02 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.02   -0.005 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.03     -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.07** -0.08** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.06**  -0.06* 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03      -0.04 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.009     0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,090    844 
 
       0.93 
 
 
-0.03     0.01 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.02      0.04 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.008     0.03 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.02     -0.04 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.06      0.06 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.05       0.02 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.06       0.03 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.02 0.04 
 
N             Y 
 
1,090   844 
 
       0.87 
 
 
 
 
0.13*     0.07 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
0.04      0.06 
(0.07) (0.08) 
 
0.05      0.06 
(0.07) (0.08) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.004   0.007 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.04    0.007 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
-0.05     -0.05 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.05     -0.04 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
 
0.02 0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
1,073   828 
 
        0.18 
 
0.15*    0.09 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.01      -0.01 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.17***0.20** 
(0.08) (0.09) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.009   -0.008 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.08     -0.03 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
-0.04     0.007 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
-0.05     -0.07 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.01      0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
1,073    828 
 
        0.42 
 
0.08       0.22 
(0.11)  (0.14) 
 
-0.08    -0.03 
(0.11)  (0.14) 
 
-0.23** -0.12 
(0.11)  (0.13) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.07       0.14 
(0.07)  (0.09) 
 
-0.06    -0.06 
(0.08)  (0.11) 
 
0.06       0.07 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
0.15*      0.18 
(0.09)   (0.11) 
  
0.02       0.04 
  
N              Y 
 
607       405 
 
       0.48 
 
0.05      0.04 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
-0.03   -0.05 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
0.05       0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
 -                 - 
 
 
-0.03    -0.002 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
-0.05     -0.02 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.01     0.003 
(0.04)  (0.03) 
 
-0.05     -0.01 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.009   0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
1,075   830 
 
        0.06 
 
0.07**   0.07 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.009   -0.01 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.04      -0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
 -                - 
 
 
-0.007   -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
-0.05*  -0.06 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
-0.02    -0.03 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.03    -0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.007   0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
1,075    830 
 
        0.00 
 
-0.03    -0.05 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.005   0.01 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.05      0.08 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
0.03     0.07* 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
0.11** 0.15*** 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.04     0.05 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.007   0.03 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
0.01     0.04 
 
N             Y 
 
1,069   826 
 
        0.20 
 
0.08*   0.10* 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.04      0.05 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.03      0.05 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
  -                 - 
  
 
0.01      0.04 
(0.02) (0.04) 
 
-0.02    -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.01     0.007 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.07*    0.06 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.02     0.06 
 
N            Y 
 
880     659 
 
        0.09 
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -               - 
 
 
-0.01    0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -              - 
  
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -               - 
 
 
-0.02    -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.02      0.05 
   
N             Y 
 
719      509 
 
         0.83 
      Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The point estimates for the increase in doctor’s visits and decrease in gynecologist visits 
are very similar. General doctors often offer some of the same services as gynecologists, 
so it may be that those without college degrees are substituting doctor’s visits for 
gynecologist visits. Other significant results for those without college were random, and 
inconclusive. Those with college degrees experienced increases in doctor’s visits and 
therapist visits in 2011, but these effects disappeared in the following years. They also 
experienced a 13-percentage point increase in flu shots in 2013. 
Insurance gains are experienced for Blacks and Hispanics. Blacks experienced 
significant gains in 2012, with a 22-percentage point increase. The point estimates on 
insurance for blacks for 2011 and 2013 are also worth noting as they represent 17-
percentage point increase in 2011, and a 9-percentage points increase in 2013. These 
percentage point increases represent uptakes of 13%-33% for Blacks depending on the 
year. Hispanics experienced significant increases in 2011 and 2013, with an increase in 
coverage of 23 percentage points in 2011 and 25 percentage points in 2013. Their 
increase in 2012 is not significant, but shows an increase in coverage of 14 percentage 
points. These increases represent uptakes between 27% and 49% for Hispanics.  
For Blacks the rest of the outcomes were not statistically significant. The high point 
estimates on health status, emergency room visits, doctor’s visits, and flu shots are worth 
noting however because of the small sample sizes. Estimates show a decrease in 
emergency room visits of 11 percentage points in 2011, and a 16 percentage point 
increase in doctor’s visits in the same year. There was also a decrease in flu shots of 13 
percentage points in 2011. Health status for blacks decreased in all three post-ACA years 
which is an interesting result considering their strong increase in doctor’s visits in 2011.   
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For Hispanics most outcomes were not statistically significant with the exception of 
doctor’s visits in 2013, and HPV vaccinations in 2011. Doctor’s visits increased by 20 
percentage points, suggesting a late take-up of primary care visits similar to the one 
observed in the male stratification. Hispanics also increased HPV vaccinations in 2011 by 
10 percentage points. The 22-percentage point increase in gynecologist visits for 
Hispanics in 2011 is also worth noting because of the small sample size.  
                                                         Discussion 
 The Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, extended insurance coverage to young 
adults by allowing them to remain on their parent’s insurance until age 26. This paper 
studies the effect of this policy on insurance rates, and health care behaviors of young 
adults. I use a diff-in-diff approach to observe how a treatment group of 23-25 year olds 
behaved in the years following the provision, relative to a comparison group of 27-29 
year olds. 
 I find that insurance rates did increase for young adults aged 23-25 following the 
provision. Results for the primary and preventative care outcome variables were for the 
most part not statistically significant and inconclusive, although the treatment group did 
experience a strong increase in doctor’s visits. While young adults experienced higher 
rates of coverage and doctor’s visits, it does not appear that they are increasing use of 
preventative care services as a result. It is surprising that preventative care use has not 
increased; this may be because young adults still have to pay for preventative care 
services and can’t.  
Heterogeneity tests reveal high gains in insurance for minorities and those without 
college educations, suggesting higher insurance gains for low-income individuals. Low-
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income individuals have a higher price elasticity for insurance, and may have 
experienced more uptake as a result. This is inconsistent with the findings from 
Barabaresco et. al. (2015) who find higher gains for men and college graduates.  
 My paper adds to the literature by studying the use of four different primary care 
physicians and studying HPV vaccinations. I did not find significant results for the use of 
primary care visits, but the point estimates on doctor’s visits did show strong increases. 
Results for HPV vaccinations were in most cases not statistically significant. Year fixed 
effects did show increases in HPV vaccinations in 2009. If young adults already had the 
vaccination in pre-ACA years, they would not need the vaccination again in post-ACA 
years. This may be why I observed no statistically significant change in HPV 
vaccinations for the treatment group in the post-ACA period. 
 There are a number of pitfalls in my analysis. Due to data limitations I was not 
able to include state fixed effects. A number of states extended insurance for young  
adults before the ACA was enacted, so young adults in these states may have experienced 
insurance gains in previous years. I was also not able to include information on current 
student status. I eliminated adults younger than age 23 to control for this, but some adults 
older than age 23 may still be in college. Many insurance plans allow current students to 
remain on their parent’s plan so student status plays an important role in insurance 
coverage. Excluding young adults aged 19-22 may also have had an effect on my results, 
as this group was also affected by the provision. 
 The available data on the effect of the ACA on young adults provides an 
opportunity for analysis not yet available for other age groups. This analysis can be 
expanded in a number of ways. Effects on different groups of young adults should be 
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sorted out, as results thus far across papers are inconclusive. Further research should also 
be devoted to the use of preventative care measures by young adults. A goal of the 
legislation was to encourage use of primary and preventative care services, so 
understanding the decision making process of young adults regarding such care is 
important. 
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Table 12: ACA Regression Results with Income 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
E.R. 
Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn.  
Visits 
Mental 
Health 
Visits 
Therapist  
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
Pre- Treat 
Mean 
0.05 *** 0.10 
(0.01)   (0.04) 
 
0.07***  0.14 
(0.01)   (0.04) 
 
0.07 **   0.07 
(0.01)   (0.04) 
 
-             0.05 
            (0.02) 
 
-0.07 ***    - 
(0.02) 
 
0.10***0.009 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.11*** 0.02 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03     0.003 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.01        0.17 
 
N             Y 
  
4,224    2,730 
 
      0.68 
 
0.008     0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
  
0.02       0.02 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.01     -0.02 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.008   -0.002 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
-0.01     -0.01 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.01   - 0.006 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.004   0.000 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.001      0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
4,339    2,732 
 
      0.91 
      
-0.02     0.005 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01      0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03     -0.04 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
  
-0.01         - 
(0.0.01 
 
 -             0.01 
             (0.02) 
 
0.02      0.05* 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.04*   0.06** 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.06**0.09*** 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.003       0.02 
 
N               Y 
 
4,240     2,733 
 
       0.78 
       
0.07*    0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.03      0.01 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.04     0.06 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.04** 0.05 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.02   0.001 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
-0.01  (0.02) 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
-0.03  -0.02 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.004     0.06 
 
N            Y 
 
4,197   2,711 
 
     0.32 
     
0.07*     0.09** 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
0.01         0.02 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
0.05        0.09* 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.007      -0.03 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
-0.06**  -0.07** 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
-0.04       -0.04 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
-0.02       -0.06 
(0.03)     (0.03) 
 
0.004         0.05 
 
N               Y 
 
4,196       2,712 
 
        0.59 
        
0.01     0.04 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.01    0.02 
(0.05) (0.07) 
 
-0.08   -0.05 
(0.05) (0.07) 
 
0.01      0.01 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
 -               - 
 
 
-0.01  -0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.07* -0.09* 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.01    -0.03 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.008    0.03 
 
N            Y 
 
2,321  1,364 
 
       0.61 
      
0.03    0.008 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
-0.001  0.01 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.02     0.01 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.03*   0.02 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
0.00   -0.005 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
0.01     0.001 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
0.002 -0.008 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
0.002    0.04 
 
N            Y 
 
4,205  2,714 
 
       .10 
      
 
-0.006   0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
-0.008  0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
-0.01   0.04 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
-        0.01 
         (0.01) 
 
-0.008  - 
(0.01) 
 
-0.006 0.006 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
-0.008  -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
-0.01   -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
0.0008  0.01 
 
N            Y 
 
4,204  2,713 
 
        .07  
      
 
-0.01  -0.04 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
-0.009   0.02 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.01   0.10** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
-          - 
 
 
0.03 0.05** 
(.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.07 0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.06  0.05* 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.06  0.04 
(0.02)(0.03) 
 
0.0004   0.04 
 
N            Y 
   
4,179   2,698 
 
      0.13 
      
 
0.04        0.03 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.02 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
 0.01      0.03 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.05***     - 
(0.01) 
 
-        0.07*** 
         (0.02) 
 
-0.01 0.15*** 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.00  0.15*** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
0.05*** 0.21*** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.02         0.12 
 
N               Y 
 
3,473     2,218 
 
      0.07 
      
 -               - 
 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.01     -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01           - 
(0.01) 
 
   -              - 
 
    
    -             - 
   
      
    -             - 
 
 
   -           0.01 
             (0.01) 
 
0.02        0.09 
 
N              Y 
 
3,144  1,1919 
 
       .91  
      
                        Appendix 
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Table 13: Trend Regression Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn. Visits Mental Health 
Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots 
 
Treat*Trend 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
-0.01     0.005 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.00      0.01 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.06**   0.06* 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01      0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.01      0.17 
 
N            Y 
 
2,713   1,703 
 
-0.01    -0.002 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
-0.01     -0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
-0.002   -0.01 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.005    -0.01 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.002     0.03 
 
N            Y 
 
2,720  1,703 
 
0.005    -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
  -             - 
 
 
-0.007   -0.02 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.03    -0.04 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-0.02    -0.03 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.001    0.01 
 
N            Y 
 
2,720   1,703 
  
-0.03    -0.05 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
  -             - 
 
 
-0.01   -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.04      0.05 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.003   0.004 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.004    0.05 
 
N           Y 
 
2,695   1,690 
 
 
-0.04    -0.08* 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
 -             - 
 
 
-0.01    -0.04 
(0.02)  (0.04) 
 
0.02    -0.008 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.02    -0.003 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.002    0.05 
 
N           Y 
 
2,698  1,691 
 
0.08     0.02 
(0.04) (0.06) 
 
  -              - 
 
 
0.06*   0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
  
0.01     0.07 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.01     0.05 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.008   0.04 
 
N          Y 
 
1,561   910 
 
-0.009    0.01 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
-            - 
 
 
0.01       0.03* 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.04**   0.04 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01       0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.005    0.06 
 
N            Y 
 
2,702    1,694 
 
 
-0.005  -0.04** 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-            - 
 
 
0.002   0.007 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
 
0.01      0.03* 
(0.01)  (0.03) 
 
0.001    0.02 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
 
0.001    0.01 
 
N           Y 
 
2,701   1,693 
 
0.04        0.004 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.04***0.06*** 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.04*     0.04 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.08*** 0.09*** 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.01        0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
2,684    1,686 
                      Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; HPV vaccinations and pap tests only contain data from 2008 and on.  
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Table 14: Female Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance  
Coverage 
Good 
Health 
Improved 
Health 
Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s  
Visits 
Mental 
Health 
Visits 
 
Therapist 
Visits 
Surgeries Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12***0.12** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
0.21***0.22*** 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.05      0.10* 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.09***     - 
(0.03) 
 
-         -0.07** 
          (0.03) 
 
-0.04   -0.08* 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
-0.06    -0.11*** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.06*   -0.05 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
  
0.01       0.14 
 
 
N              Y 
 
 
2,339  1,375 
 
 
0.01      0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
0.03     0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
-0.007  0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
0.01     0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
-0.001  0.01 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
-0.00   0.01 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.009   0.02 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.002     0.04 
 
 
N              Y 
 
 
2,343   1,376 
 
-0.04   0.02 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.008  0.07 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.02   0.002 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-            -0.03 
             (0.03) 
 
0.02           - 
(0.02) 
 
0.06*    0.07* 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.06*    0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.08***0.08** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.007     0.04 
 
 
N               Y 
 
 
2,344    1,377 
 
 
0.05   -0.001 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.01   -0.03 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.01     0.02 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.03          - 
(0.03) 
 
-            -0.01 
           (0.04) 
  
0.003   0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.01   -0.005 
(0.03) (0.05) 
 
-0.04   -0.05 
(0.03) (0.05) 
 
0.008     0.06 
 
  
N              Y 
 
 
2,323   1,366 
 
 
0.07      0.08 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.003  0.05 
(0.05) (0.07) 
 
-0.02    0.01 
(0.05) (0.07) 
 
-0.008       - 
(0.03) 
 
-            0.000 
            (0.04) 
 
-0.05    -0.05 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.04     -0.08 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.007   -0.02 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.007     0.03 
 
 
N               Y 
 
 
2,324    1,366 
 
0.02     -0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.05     0.01 
(0.03) (0.05) 
 
-0.01     0.01 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.05**   0.03 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.01      0.002 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.04      -0.004 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.02     -0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
0.005     0.07 
 
 
N              Y 
 
 
2,327    1,367 
 
0.07**   0.08*** 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.01      0.05 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
0.02      0.04 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
-0.00   0.004 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.04***-0.04* 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02    -0.04* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.01     -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.004       0.01 
 
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,327     1,367 
 
-0.00   -0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.01     0.07 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.001   0.008 
(0.04) (0.02) 
 
0.04*    0.04 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
0.03      0.01 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.02     -0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
0.02      0.04 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.005      0.02 
  
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,321    1,364 
 
-0.03    -0.07 
(0.04) (0.06) 
 
0.008   0.04 
(0.04) (0.06) 
 
-0.009  0.09 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-            -0.06* 
             (0.03) 
 
0.02           - 
(0.02) 
 
0.08**   0.06 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.07** 0.008 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.08**   0.02 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.006      0.06 
 
 
N                Y 
 
 
2,312    1,357 
 
 
0.08***  0.07 
(0.03)  (0.05) 
 
0.05       0.07 
(0.03)   (0.05) 
 
0.04       0.08 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.05***        - 
(0.01) 
 
-                 0.07*** 
                 (0.02) 
 
0.02          0.13*** 
(0.02)      (0.03) 
 
0.05**      0.10*** 
(0.02)      (0.03) 
 
0.12***   0.19*** 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.05            0.11 
 
 
N                    Y 
 
 
2,255         1,334 
             Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; pap tests and gynecologist visits are excluded 
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Table 15: Male Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Mental Health 
Visits  
Therapist  
Visits  
Surgeries Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
0.13**   0.11* 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.12**  0.08 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.11** 0.06 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.05    -0.03 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
-0.04    -0.04 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
-0.04   -0.05 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
-0.02    -0.04 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.008      0.22 
 
N               Y 
 
1,885    1,355 
 
 
0.000      0.02 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.03      0.01 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
  
-0.02     -0.06* 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
   -               - 
 
 
-0.002     -0.02 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
-0.02  -0.06*** 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.03    -0.04* 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02     -0.03* 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.006      0.04 
 
N               Y 
 
1,896     1,357 
 
0.003    -0.008 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.01      -0.01 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.05     -0.09* 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
0.00      -0.003 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.005     -0.00 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.04        0.03 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.05        0.07* 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.005      0.03 
 
N                Y 
 
1,896     1,357 
 
0.08        0.11* 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.08         0.06 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.08        0.10* 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
-0.07** -0.08** 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.12***-0.11*** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.08**  -0.05 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
-0.09**-0.10** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.008     0.05 
 
N              Y 
  
1,874      1,346 
 
0.06       0.10 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.02       -0.007 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
0.15***  0.14** 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
  -                    - 
 
 
-0.02        -0.07 
(0.04)     (0.04) 
 
-0.09*     -0.10* 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
-0.04        -0.02 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
-0.07        -0.09 
(0.04)     (0.05) 
 
0.01          0.05 
 
N                 Y 
 
1,872       1,347 
 
 
 
0.04         0.02 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
0.06         0.01 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
0.05         0.01 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
-0.00      -0.007 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
-0.01        -0.02 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
-0.01       -0.00 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
-0.02       -0.008 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.007        0.03 
 
N                 Y 
 
1,878       1,348 
 
 
-0.07** -0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.01    -0.008 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.002       0.02 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
-0.02     -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
0.04       0.03 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.005    0.003 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.008    -0.03 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.006     0.03 
 
N               Y 
 
1,877    1,347 
 
-0.008      -0.01 
(0.03)     (0.04) 
 
0.01        -0.005 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
-0.03        -0.06 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
    -                - 
 
 
-0.02        -0.03 
(0.02)     (0.02) 
 
0.009       0.006 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.01         0.000 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.02            0.02 
(0.02)     (0.03) 
 
0.006         0.02 
 
N                  Y 
 
1,874       1,346 
 
0.001     -0.01 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.03       0.01 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.04      0.11** 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.06**      0.03 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.07*       0.06 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.06*       0.01 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.04        -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.008      0.02 
 
N                Y 
 
1,867     1,342 
 
-             -0.001 
               (0.03) 
 
-0.009    -0.01 
(0.02)   (0.03) 
 
0.01            - 
(0.02) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-         -0.05*** 
          (0.01) 
 
0.003  -0.03** 
(0.009)(0.01) 
 
0.03***      - 
(0.01) 
 
0.01       0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,218      884 
                Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; pap tests and gynecologist visits are exclude 
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Table 16: No College Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved  
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Surgeries Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
Year 2008 
 
 
Year 2009 
 
 
Year 2011 
 
 
Year 2012 
 
 
Year 2013 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
0.18**    0.16* 
(0.08)   (0.10) 
 
0.24***0.22** 
(0.08) (0.11) 
 
0.15*      0.18* 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
   -               - 
 
 
-0.09*   -0.004 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.13**   -0.03 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
-0.19***  -0.09 
(0.06)    (0.08) 
 
-0.13**    -0.08 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
0.01         0.15 
 
N                Y 
 
956          569 
 
 
0.02        0.02 
(0.06)    (0.06) 
 
-0.003    0.002 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.06       -0.09 
(0.06)    (0.06) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.01         0.01 
(0.03)    (0.04) 
 
-0.06       -0.04 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
0.00          0.03 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
-0.004      0.03 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
0.009       0.04 
 
N                Y 
 
960        570 
 
-0.02         -0.01 
(0.07)     (0.08) 
 
-0.08         -0.02 
(0.07)     (0.08) 
 
-0.05        -0.05 
(0.07)     (0.08) 
 
   -                  - 
 
 
-0.001      0.006 
(0.04)     (0.06) 
 
0.004         0.06 
(0.06)     (0.07) 
 
0.09*         0.10 
(0.05)     (0.06) 
 
0.07           0.10 
(0.05)     (0.07) 
0.009         0.05 
 
N                  Y 
 
961           571 
 
0.04         0.06 
(0.08)   (0.10) 
 
0.008      -0.03 
(0.08)   (0.11) 
 
0.04          0.13 
(0.08)   (0.10) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.09*     -0.09 
(0.05)   (0.07) 
 
-0.08       -0.04 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.14**   -0.06 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.09     -0.15* 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
0.01       0.08 
 
N              Y 
 
951       566 
 
0.08       0.13 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
0.06         0.13 
(0.08)   (0.11) 
  
0.21***0.21** 
(0.08)  (0.11) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.01       0.003 
(0.05)   (0.07) 
 
-0.05      -0.04 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.04       -0.10 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.12 *  -0.16* 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
0.01        0.10 
 
N               Y 
 
953        568 
 
 
0.05         -0.01 
(0.12)    (0.17) 
 
-0.16       -0.25 
(0.11)    (0.18) 
 
-0.21* -0.46*** 
(0.12) (0.16) 
 
    -                - 
 
 
-0.02         0.04 
(0.07)    (0.10) 
 
-0.08        0.06 
(0.09)     (0.13) 
 
-0.09       -0.10 
(0.09)     (0.14) 
 
0.07       0.27** 
(0.09)  (0.12) 
0.05        0.14 
 
N               Y 
 
486         247 
 
0.06        0.11* 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.003     0.09 
(0.05)   (0.07) 
 
0.07         0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
-0.03    -0.009 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.05      -0.06 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.01         0.00 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.07*   -0.08* 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
0.01       0.08 
 
N               Y 
 
954        568 
 
 
-0.05      -0.06 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
0.02       0 .06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.02        0.03 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.01      -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.06       0.05 
(0.03)  (0.05) 
 
-0.005  -0.05* 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.004   -0.005 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
0.01      0.06 
  
N             Y 
 
954      568 
 
-0.01      -0.02 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.002    0.06 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.01     0.009 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.03    -0.006 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.00      0.008 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.01         0.01 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.002     0.03 
(0.04)   (0.06) 
0.01       0.07 
 
N              Y 
 
952        567 
 
 
-0.16***-0.18** 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
0.007     -0.007 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
0.01          0.03 
(0.07)    (0.08) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.05          0.08 
(0.04)    (0.05) 
 
0.19*** 0.22*** 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
0.14***    0.11* 
(0.05)    (0.07) 
 
0.07          0.08 
(0.05)    (0.06) 
0.02       0.06 
 
N               Y 
 
949         565 
 
0.06        0.06 
(0.04)   (0.06) 
 
0.03       0.004 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.07        -0.01 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
  
   -                 - 
 
 
-.008      -0.01 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.01  0.10*** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.03    0.11*** 
(0.04)   (0.04) 
 
0.02    0.15*** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
0.01      0.10 
 
N             Y 
 
775      458 
 
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -                - 
 
 
-0.02     0.02 
(0.04)(0.06) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
  -               - 
  
 
  -               - 
 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.03     0.01 
(0.02)(0.03) 
0.02     0.09 
 
N             Y 
 
673        363 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
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Table 17: College Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
Year 2008 
 
 
Year 2009 
 
 
Year 2011 
 
 
Year 2012 
 
 
Year 2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
0.02       0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
0.11**    0.12** 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
  
0.01         0.03 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
-0.03       -0.02 
(0.03)    (0.03) 
 
-0.04        -0.01 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
-0.05        -0.05 
(0.04)     (0.04) 
 
-0.005     -0.02 
(0.04)    (0.04) 
 
0.01         0.13 
 
N                Y 
 
1,418     1,042 
 
-0.02     -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.01        0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.00 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
   -               - 
 
 
0.01       0.002 
(0.01)   (0.02) 
 
0.01         0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02     -0.009 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
-0.02      -0.01 
(0.02)   (0.02) 
 
0.01       0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,423   1,042 
 
-0.08     -0.11* 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.02       -0.01 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.008   -0.03 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
-0.009  0.009 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.08    0.12*** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.05       0.08* 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.06      0.10** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.01      0.03 
 
N              Y 
 
1,423   1,042 
 
 
 
 
0.08       0.05 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.04       0.007 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.02       0.02 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
 -                 - 
  
 
-0.01    -0.05 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.06    -0.08 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.01     -0.03 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
-0.04     -0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.007     0.06 
 
N               Y 
 
1,410   1,035 
 
0.16*** 0.22*** 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
0.06        0.06 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
0.06        0.16** 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
0.004     -0.03 
(0.04)   (0.05) 
 
-0.08     -0.13** 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
-0.07     -0.07 
(0.05)   (0.056 
 
-0.01      -0.07 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
0.008     0.04 
 
N              Y 
 
1,409    1,035 
 
 
 
-0.01      0.04 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
 
0.002    0.01 
(0.09) (0.10) 
 
-0.03     0.01 
(0.09)  (0.12) 
 
   -                - 
 
 
0.05       0.07 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.02      0.003 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
-0.02     -0.003 
(0.07)   (0.08) 
 
-0.05      -0.07 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
0.01        0.07 
 
N               Y 
 
799        558 
 
-0.004    0.01 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.003    0.04 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.02     0.003 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.004    0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.008    -0.03 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
-0.03      -0.05 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.004    0.004 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.008    0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
1,413   1,036 
 
0.08** 0.07* 
(0.03)(0.04) 
 
0.03      0.07 
(0.04)(0.04) 
 
0.03      0.09*** 
(0.03)(0.04) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.004    0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
-0.03    -0.009 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01      0.02 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.02     -0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.009    0.03 
  
N             Y 
 
1,412   1,035 
 
0.00       0.02 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
  
-0.07     0.03 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.04    0.21*** 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
   -               - 
  
 
0.04       0.04 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.09*    0.07 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.10**   0.03 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.06      -0.00 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.009    0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
1,400   1,028 
 
 
 
0.08      0.12* 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.03      0.07 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.05      0.14* 
(0.06) (0.07) 
 
   -               - 
 
 
0.11***0.11*** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
0.04       0.03 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.07***  0.06* 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.13*** 0.11*** 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
0.05       0.08 
 
N               Y 
 
1,179     863 
 
  -                - 
 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.03      -0.06* 
(0.03)   (0.04) 
 
   -                 - 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
0.01       0.02 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
 
0.03       0.10 
 
N               Y 
 
1,121      793 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 18: Black Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s Visits Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
0.16         0.16 
(0.09)    (0.12) 
  
0.26***  0.25** 
(0.09)   (0.11) 
 
0.08         0.10 
(0.09)   (0.11) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
-0.15*** -0.09 
(0.05)    (0.06) 
 
-0.17***  -0.17** 
(0.07)    (0.08) 
 
-0.19*** -0.17** 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
-0.08        -0.12 
(0.06)    (0.07) 
 
0.03          0.15 
 
N                Y 
 
708         434 
 
0.03         0.07 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
-0.04      0.04 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.08      -0.03 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.05      -0.008 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.02     -0.03 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.05       -0.01 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.07       0.01 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
0.01        0.03 
 
N               Y 
 
712       435 
 
-0.12    -0.03 
(0.08)  (0.12) 
 
-0.09     -0.08 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
-0.10     -0.12 
(0.07)   (0.10) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
0.05      0.005 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.02        0.02 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
0.06        0.06 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
0.09*      0.11* 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.01      0.05 
 
N              Y 
 
712        435 
 
-0.15    -0.11 
(0.10)  (0.14) 
 
-0.05    -0.11 
(0.09)  (0.13) 
 
-0.03     -0.03 
(0.10)  (0.12) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.10*   -0.11 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.07       0.03 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
-0.13*    -0.04 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
-0.05      -0.10 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
  
0.03        0.07 
 
N               Y 
 
708        434 
 
 
 
0.11        0.20 
(0.10)   (0.13) 
 
0.08        0.08 
(0.10)  (0.12) 
 
0.004      0.13 
(0.10)   (0.13) 
  
  -                - 
 
 
-0.03     -0.06 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
-0.15** -0.26*** 
(0.07)  (0.09) 
 
-0.17** -0.19** 
(0.07)   (0.09) 
 
-0.03     -0.12 
(0.07)  (0.09) 
 
0.02      0.10 
 
N              Y 
  
708       434 
 
 
0.004   -0.03 
(0.12) (0.15) 
 
-0.09    -0.26 
(0.12)  (0.16) 
 
0.09       0.04 
(0.13)  (0.17) 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
-0.04    0.002 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
0.02       0.19 
(0.09) (0.12) 
 
-0.05    0.002 
(0.09)  (0.12) 
 
-0.05     -0.06 
(0.09)  (0.12) 
 
0.01      0.10 
 
N             Y 
 
437     263 
 
0.06        0.02 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
 
-0.001   -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.06       0.02 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
    
  -                - 
 
 
-0.007   -0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.01       0.01 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
0.03       0.05 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
 
-0.05      -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
0.01       0.08 
 
N              Y 
 
708        434 
 
0.02       0.04 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
0.07        0.04 
(0.06)   (0.07) 
 
0.01        0.02 
(0.05)   (0.05) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
-0.04     -0.06 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.03    -0.02 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
-0.05     -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.04     -0.04 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.006    0.03 
 
N              Y 
 
708       434 
 
-0.05      -0.04 
(0.08)   (0.11) 
 
-0.03     -0.03 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
0.01       0.11 
(0.09)   (0.11) 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
0.03        0.10 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
 
0.06       0.10 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
0.06       0.12 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
0.10       0.10 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
0.009    0.08 
 
N              Y 
 
702      429 
 
0.09        0.18** 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.007   -0.05* 
(0.06)   (0.05) 
 
0.003    -0.03 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.05       0.01 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
0.004   -0.005 
(0.03)  (0.02) 
 
0.07*     0.04 
(0.04)  (0.03) 
 
0.12***  0.14*** 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.03       0.11 
    
N              Y 
 
598       368 
 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
  
 -                   - 
  
 
-0.004    -0.00 
(0.04)   (0.06) 
 
  -                   - 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
  -                  - 
 
 
 -                  - 
 
 
-0.01      -0.003 
(0.02)    (0.02) 
 
0.02         0.06 
 
N                 Y 
 
586          347 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 19: Hispanic Heterogeneity Results with Income 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Good Health Improved 
Health Status 
Emergency 
Room Visits 
Doctor’s 
Visits 
Gyn. Visits Mental 
Health Visits 
Therapist 
Visits 
Flu Shots HPV 
Vaccinations 
Pap Tests 
 
Treat*2011 
 
 
Treat*2012 
 
 
Treat*2013 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2013 
 
 
R-Squared 
 
Controls 
 
Observations 
 
0.24*** 0.18* 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
 
0.18***  0.09 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
0.24*** 0.14 
(0.08)  (0.10) 
 
  -                 - 
 
 
0.01        0.01 
(0.05)   (0.06) 
 
-0.06     -0.001 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
-0.08     -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
-0.07      -0.06 
(0.06)   (0.08) 
 
0.01       0.17 
  
N              Y 
 
1086     625 
 
0.01       0.01 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.02       0.03 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
-0.02    -0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
-0.03     -0.05** 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
 
-0.07** -0.08** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.06** -0.07** 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
-0.03      -0.05 
(0.03)   (0.03) 
 
0.009     0.08 
 
N              Y 
 
1.090    625 
 
-0.03     0.01 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
-0.02      0.10 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.008     0.01 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
-0.02     -0.02 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
 
0.06      0.08 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.05       0.04 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.06       0.06 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.01      0.06 
 
N             Y 
 
1090    625 
 
 
 
0.13*     0.09 
(0.07)  (0.10) 
 
0.04      0.08 
(0.07) (0.09) 
 
0.05      0.13 
(0.07) (0.09) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
-0.004  -0.001 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
-0.04     -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.05     -0.07 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
-0.05     -0.06 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
 
0.01      0.05 
 
N             Y 
 
1,073   618 
 
0.15*    0.12 
(0.08)  (0.11) 
 
0.01      -0.01 
(0.08)  (0.11) 
 
0.17***0.15 
(0.08) (0.11) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.009   -0.003 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
 
-0.08     -0.05 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.04   - 0.008 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.05     -0.06 
(0.06)  (0.09) 
 
0.01      0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
1,073    618 
 
 
0.08       0.31* 
(0.11)  (0.16) 
 
-0.08      0.07 
(0.11)  (0.17) 
 
-0.23** -0.07 
(0.11)  (0.16) 
 
  -               - 
 
 
0.07      0.005 
(0.07)  (0.10) 
 
-0.06    -0.25* 
(0.08)  (0.14) 
 
0.06       -0.09 
(0.08)  (0.12) 
 
0.15*      -0.02 
(0.09)   (0.13) 
  
0.02       0.08 
  
N              Y 
 
607       279 
 
0.05      0.04 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
-0.03   -0.04 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.05       0.02 
(0.04) (0.06) 
 
 -                 - 
 
 
-0.03     0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
-0.05     -0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
 
-0.01      0.01 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
 
-0.05     0.007 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.009   0.07 
 
N             Y 
 
1,075   619 
 
0.07**   0.03 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.009   -0.001 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.04       0.03 
(0.03)  (0.05) 
 
 -                - 
 
 
-0.007  -0.009 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
-0.05*  -0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
-0.02    -0.03 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
-0.03    -0.05 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
 
0.007   0.03 
 
N             Y 
 
1,075    619 
 
-0.03    -0.11 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
-0.005   0.03 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
 
0.05      0.15 
(0.06)  (0.09) 
 
  -                - 
 
 
0.03     0.11*** 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
0.11** 0.23*** 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.04     0.06 
(0.04) (0.05) 
 
0.007   0.09 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
0.01     0.07 
 
N             Y 
 
1,069   617 
 
 
0.08*   0.09 
(0.04) (0.07) 
 
0.04      0.03 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
 
0.03      0.03 
(0.05) (0.08) 
 
  -                 - 
  
 
0.01      0.02 
(0.02) (0.05) 
 
-0.02    -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.05) 
 
0.01     -0.02 
(0.03) (0.06) 
 
0.07*    0.09 
(0.04) (0.07) 
 
0.02     0.10 
 
N            Y 
 
880     486 
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -               - 
 
 
-0.01    0.05 
(0.04) (0.07) 
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -              - 
  
 
 -               - 
 
 
 -               - 
 
 
-0.02    -0.01 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
 
0.02      0.07 
   
N             Y 
 
719      373 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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